Presidents and executive term structure -- Introduction -- Becoming terminal: presidents operating in dual frames -- Research design and methodological overview -- Plan of the book -- Institutionalism: presidential behavior and the rule of law -- Developing a definitional framework -- Before and after the Twenty-Second Amendment: norms vs. institutions -- Executive term structure: an unexplored area of inquiry -- The term limit debate -- Choice in executive term structure: the political reality -- Conclusion -- The motivational structure of terminal presidents: what to expect and why -- Introduction -- Dual frames of reference -- The cycle of presidential periods -- Legacy agenda of presidents: domestic vs. foreign policy -- Conclusion -- Changing the status quo: the decree power of US presidents -- Introduction -- Proactive power and the initiative to decree -- Decree power in the United States -- Executive initiative vs. delegated authority: how the Court and Congress handle presidential decrees -- The collection and coding of US presidential decrees -- Conclusion -- Terminal logic behavior of US presidents -- The model: some expectations -- Data results -- Emergency power decrees: after the 1976 National Emergencies Act -- Emergency powers and terminal logic behavior -- Conclusion -- Decree power in Argentina and Brazil -- Introduction -- Term limits and decree power -- The changing constitutional boundaries of MPVs and DNUs -- How the Court and Congress handle MPVs and DNUs -- Conclusion -- Terminal logic behavior in Argentina and Brazil: a comparative look -- Introduction -- Using the case study method -- The effect of reforms on decree issuance: the evidence in brief -- Data and analysis: explaining trends of frequency -- Concluding remarks: moving beyond individual differences -- Anticipating the effects of terminal logic behavior: avenues of future inquiry -- Appendix. formal decree power as stipulated by Brazil's 1988 constitution -- Notes -- Bibliography.